Yitzhak Rabin- a reflection

Leon Orbach

By the time this article appears, Israel will have voted in what may prove to be one of the most consequential elections in its history. After years of deepening political fractures, the country faces a choice not only about who will govern, but about the kind of Israel it wants to become. So many fractures have appeared in Israeli society, with people on both sides of those fractures convinced that theirs is the only way. The fractures are presented as binary choices, but are they?

If and when today’s opposition parties form Government, the path to healing will be long and hard. It has taken 17 years to move from a transformational Likud to a government whose politics have come to be defined by division, racism, corruption, a lack of accountability and above all else, the abrogation of the fundamental social contract between the state and its people: the obligation to protect them from danger. A generation of Israelis have known little else.

The heroes who once shaped the country’s aspirations and actions of the past have become shadowy figures for much of the population.

One of those heroes is Yitzhak Rabin z”l, assassinated 31 years ago, 4th Nov 1995. Nearly two generations have reached adulthood since his death. His legacy has become one of the fractures in Israeli society. One fact, however is irrefutable. He was the first and the only Israeli Prime Minister to be assassinated. He was killed, not by some terrorist or in armed combat, but by a Jewish extremist who opposed Rabin’s peace initiatives and territorial compromises, invoking a religious-nationalist vision of the Land of Israel as justification for murder.

This year Hatikvah Australia will mark the anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination by an exploration of Yitzhak Rabin’s Legacy through debate, art, and song.

In preparing for this exploration, I encountered a striking discrepancy between perception and reality. It reminded me of the gap between the vision of the Zionism I learnt in the Zionist Youth movement and the reality I discovered as an oleh, and later as an adult becoming increasingly politically aware.

It is ironic that Bibi Netanyahu has created this image of himself as the flagbearer for Israel and the world, alerting all to the dangers of a nuclear Iran. He has demonstrated his focus and obsession by the use of dramatic props at the UN, sanctioning covert operations to take out centrifuges, scientists, military and political leaders and more recently overt operations to destroy Iran’s nuclear and missile capability once and for all.

For Bibi, when force fails to meet an objective, the answer has consistently been … more force.

But the historical record tells a more complicated story.

In 1992, when Rabin returned to the role of Prime Minister, he received a briefing from the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, that Iran’s path to becoming a nuclear power was approaching a point of no return.

Rabin understood that Israel should rethink its strategic assumptions. David Ben-Gurion’s "Periphery Doctrine" had sought strategic alliances with non-Arab nations on the periphery of the Middle East—particularly Iran (under the Shah) and Turkey, to counterbalance hostile Arab states surrounding Israel.

Rabin pivoted to a strategy of stabilising the relationship with the immediate periphery Sunni nations and of gaining international support to prevent Iran becoming a nuclear nation.

This strategic shift had three interconnected elements:

1. Accelerating a peace process

Rabin recognised the need to build a regional coalition of the immediate inner circle of moderate Sunni states. This strategy was seen as the key to meeting the looming challenge of a nuclear Iran.

The Oslo process was a defining expression of this approach

2. Mobilising the United States and the international community.

Rabin sought to convince the US to take international leadership in containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions through a combination of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure. The CIA was originally dismissive of Rabin’s assessment of the potential threat not only to Israel but to the world.

Global non-proliferation policy towards Iran was seen as key to reducing regional instability.

3. Establishing a dedicated focus on Iran.

Rabin recognised the need for sustained attention to Iran as a strategic threat. This involved coordinating the diplomatic, military, intelligence arms of government to ensure that Israel was prepared for all contingencies in responding to Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions.

The appointment of a dedicated Iranian File Co-ordinator was the outcome of this approach.

Earlier, in 1985, years before the 1992 briefing, as Defence Minister Rabin implemented Israel’s ‘Iron Fist’ policy, gaining a reputation as a fierce and relentless force working to crush Palestinian nationalism. While the use of force was somewhat successful, it didn’t prevent the outbreak of the 1st Intifada in 1987. The diplomatic and geopolitical landscape began to change. As a result of that changing landscape, in 1988 Arafat agreed to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist, in exchange for a "land-for-peace" framework. This was followed by the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference marking the first time Israel sat face-to-face with Palestinian delegates in formal negotiations. These faltering steps towards some sort of agreement, were characterised by distrust and unwilling actors operating behind the scenes. Both sides faced internal opposition and competing agendas. Nevertheless, the diplomatic process opened possibilities that military force alone had not achieved and the 1st Intifada did stop.

Yitzhak Rabin’s new strategies, developed in 1992, reflected a hard-earned understanding of the extent of the threat posed by a nuclear Iran. He also understood that this threat could not be addressed through military superiority alone. Diplomacy, regional cooperation and international pressure had to be part of the response.

After Rabin’s assassination, Peres failed to secure a mandate to continue the process. Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister (1996 -1999). During his first term, Netanyahu made concessions, under international pressure, but offered little more than lip service to sustained commitment to the broader vision of peace.

Rabin’s assassination did not stop attempts to progress the Peace initiatives.

Between 1999 and 2007, further agreements, initiatives, road maps and conferences sought to advance negotiations. Yet distrust deepened. Violence repeatedly triggered retaliation, and each new cycle undermined the fragile prospect of cooperation.

By now, both sides had discovered that distrust was easy to cultivate and that any act of violence would trigger an automatic response of violence – thereby derailing any tentative attempts at working together to find a way to live together.

Bibi’s return to power in 2009 heralded an almost uninterrupted leadership lasting some 16 years. His approach rested heavily on military strength, technological superiority and deterrence. He appeared to place considerable faith in the assumption that Israel could maintain its security through force, while relying on the United States and other allies to support its strategic position. This unwavering belief that the world and especially the USA will always back Israel, was based on the assumption that Israel represents the common interests of democracy and stability.

Iran became central to Netanyahu's political identity. He presented himself as the leader uniquely capable of recognising and confronting the threat. But the emphasis on military power came at the expense of a broader political strategy for addressing the conflicts surrounding Israel.

Gaza has provided a devastating illustration of the limitations of an approach that responds to violence primarily through force, Unlike Rabin, there were no parallel strategies to defuse the situation or to create the political conditions necessary for lasting security. Even more telling, Bibi’s responses to violence were predictable and helpful to an enemy seeking to generate chaos and to win the war of world public opinion.

Rabin, too, understood the necessity of force. He was not a naïve idealist, nor did he underestimate Israel's enemies. He was surrounded by capable advisors, including men like Ephraim Sneh and Uri Saguy. But he came to understand that bloodshed will only bring more bloodshed, and that Israel needed the courage to change course.

Rabin was able to pivot. He understood that Israel’s security required more than military might. Rabin cared about Israel’s future.

Echoing the words of President Anwar Sadat in 1977, who said:

"No more war, no more bloodshed"

Rabin said to his lifelong adversary, Yasser Arafat:

"We say to you today in a loud and a clear voice: Enough of blood and tears. Enough. We have no desire for revenge. We harbor no hatred against you. We, like you, are people who want to build a home, to plant a tree, to love, to live side by side with you in dignity, in empathy, as human beings, as free men."

31 years after Yitzhak’s assassination, we are still waiting to see whether his legacy stands the test of time. We are waiting to see whether a leader will emerge with the same strategic vision for a safe, secure Israel, free to pursue its self-determination. We are waiting for a leader confident enough to enable and encourage neighbouring nations to do the same.